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Abstract: In many US cities, especially those in the Rust Belt, the environmental
goods and services (EGS) industry has played a significant role in restructuring local
economies to promote new, flexible, and “creative” forms of service-based labour. And
yet much of the environmental work conducted in these cities has been directed at an
industrial past, cleaning up the waste left over from long-departed manufacturing sec-
tors. Returning to David Harvey’s earlier work on the urban process, this paper develops
a theory of waste switching that situates EGS within a larger renegotiation of space and
time across city landscapes. This theory is fleshed out in case studies of the EGS industry
in Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee, where new cycles of accumulation have been
built on refuse, toxins, and dead labour. These “toxi-cities” and their cleanup challenge
traditional conceptions of urbanisation as spatially—but also temporally—bounded.
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Gravedigging
Recently Jason Moore (2015) has put an ecological spin on the old Marxist notion
that capitalist society creates its own gravediggers.1 For Moore, capitalism relies
on a strategy of “Cheap Nature” that, through the law of value, transforms land-
scapes into extractable sources of cheap labour, food, energy, and raw materials.
But the end of Cheap Nature is in sight, Moore says. Capitalism has devastated
the planet, leading to widespread environmental catastrophe and economic
depression. This has become especially apparent since the 1970s, as the opportu-
nities for appropriating cheap natures have decidedly dwindled. The accumulation
of capital from unpaid work is suddenly challenged by the “accumulation of
waste and toxification” (Moore 2015:308). Moore argues that new methods of
financialisation and a shift in attention to the sphere of reproduction have helped
postpone the ultimate collapse of capitalism into the future. But as an inherently
“wasteful system” capitalism’s days are surely numbered (Moore 2014). The onset
of terminal crisis is “unpredictable but inevitable” (Moore 2015:1).
The environmental goods and services (EGS) industry plants a seed of doubt in
this thesis. Since it emerged on a global level during the 1960s and 1970s, EGS
has made a living off the toxic wastelands that Moore and others see as fatal to
capital accumulation (Sinclair-Desgagne 2008). In the US, this industry has been
especially profitable. With the exclusion of a period from 1996 to 1999, EGS
growth has remained higher than that of US gross domestic product (GDP) (EBJ
2015). Today, the US industry produces around $360 billion in total revenues
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each year and accounts for nearly 40% of the global market for environmental
services (US International Trade Commission 2013). In addition to direct prof-
itability, environmental services have also played a major role in the cleanup and
“post-industrial” restructuring of urban economies over the past few decades, par-
ticularly in Rust Belt cities (Hathaway 2012). The remediation and reclamation of
old manufacturing sites and military testing facilities has reopened these spaces,
both within and beyond the city, to new cycles of investment and value extrac-
tion, either in the form of tourism or further development (see, e.g., Dillon 2014).
In places like Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh, the cleanup of urban land-
scapes has been part of a larger set of initiatives for building a “creative city” that
provides “innovative solutions to urban problems” (Landry 2008:xvi). Seen in this
context, the EGS industry shows how the greening of urban space is more than a
reaction to environmental disaster; it is also a direct reflection of and attempt to
reverse economic decline. If capitalist society creates its own gravediggers, it has
created its own graverobbers as well. The toxic refuse of the past, once pro-
nounced dead and buried, is now dug up, reanimated, and turned into profit.
Environmental destruction, it turns out, can make for good business (see also
Schoenberger 2015).
Rising from the soils of capitalist ruin, the EGS sector provides an empirical
example of what David Harvey (2018:93) has recently reminded us: that crises
do not necessarily spell the end of capitalism but “set the stage for its renewal”.
Fully grasping this point, for Harvey, requires digging up a faint, but vital, cur-
rent in Marx’s value theory. This is the concept of what Harvey calls “anti-
value”, introduced by Marx in passing at the end of the first chapter of Capital.
Unlike Moore’s (2015:276) “negative value”, which amasses in earnest only after
the “paradigm moment” of climate change, anti-value has been imbricated with
accumulation from the start (and in ways that are not merely “latent”). In Har-
vey’s reading of Marx, value only exists in dialectical relation to its potential loss
—to the threat of devaluation and uselessness. Anti-value is thus depicted as a
kind of ghost that “hovers over ... [capital] as it circulates”, always threatening
to interrupt the latter’s continuity (Harvey 2018:72). And yet this is also a pro-
ductive relationship: when overcome—”redeemed as it were” (Harvey 2018:74)
—anti-value can re-establish the geographic and temporal limits of extraction
and exchange.
To the extent they are rendered “useless”, contaminated landscapes, discarded
commodities, and “disposable” individuals are real world embodiments of anti-
value (cf. Katz 2011; Wright 2006). Vinay Gidwani (2008:19) has developed this
point in his work on waste-picking economies in India. “Waste”, he argues, “is
the specter that haunts value”—marking certain things, places, and lives as sur-
plus and literal refuse. But this haunting can also be reversed. In redeeming sites
of waste, making them productive and profitable once again, the EGS industry in
India and elsewhere reveals an important aspect of anti-value, one that is implicit
but not fully fleshed out in Harvey’s account. This is its temporality. In toxic
wastelands, anti-value is located “in the past”—as the bygone leftovers of previ-
ous cycles of accumulation. In the US, such anachronism bares itself most clearly
in abandoned urban manufacturing sites, where rusting equipment and arsenic-
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laced soils leave traces of the past on their surroundings, and within the bodies of
those living nearby. Isn’t the goal of EGS work to re-collect and recycle these
pasts, to bring them back into the productive spaces of the capitalist present?
To pose such a question is to consider the environmental sector, particularly
remediation services, as a potential challenge to the spatio-temporal boundedness
of urban space. The geographical study of urbanisation has long been dominated
by work examining traditional agglomerations and market exchange relations
(Schoenberger and Walker 2017). Focusing solely on these structures, on how
cities appear today, overlooks the actual social relations that have made urbanisa-
tion possible, some of which are non-urban and non-present (cf. Brenner and
Schmid 2017). What’s needed instead is to examine the “historical-geographical
roots” of contemporary markets (Schoenberger and Walker 2017:938). The rise of
environmental services suggests that these roots run through contaminated soil.
But how deep do they go? How much of today’s urban growth is built on past
cycles of toxic production?
This paper explores the extent to which “creative cities” are constructed on
and through timeworn wastelands of anti-value—what I call toxi-cities. On the
one hand, toxi-cities include the actual toxic practices of past industrial cycles and
military activities, which provide new sources of profit for urban economies and
often act as a kind of temporal hinterlands for value extraction. This demonstrates
how the city achieves a “creative” economy not just through the circulation of
ideas but “because it creates problems to be solved”, including legacies of toxi-
city (Schoenberger and Walker 2017:947). Sometimes, as in Flint, Michigan, these
legacies have literally manufactured a toxic city (cf. Benz 2017). Building on the
work of Gidwani and Reddy (2011), toxi-cities also refer to waste in a larger sense,
to the often-racialised bodies and spaces excluded from, threatened, and made
obsolete by urban revitalisation. Though still a relatively small industry in the glo-
bal sense, with a $1.2 trillion market (EBJ 2017), the environmental sector pro-
vides insights into how such toxi-cities are managed and remediated in urban
space, and how this remediation relies on a constant renegotiation with the past,
of digging up what had been labelled as waste and left for dead.
The analysis of toxi-cities contributes to an emerging scholarship within geog-
raphy on waste (see, e.g., Gidwani 2016; Gidwani and Reddy 2011; Katz 2011;
Krupar 2011; Lindner and Meissner 2016). Some of this literature has consid-
ered the ways waste cleanup can conserve the past within the present, espe-
cially in urban space. In her study of brownfield redevelopment in San
Francisco, for instance, Lindsey Dillon (2014:1207) argues that the very idea of
the “post-industrial” is challenged by the work of remediation, since industriali-
sation remains, as it were, in the toxic debris left behind. Thus, if the urban can
no longer be conceived as spatially fixed (Brenner and Schmid 2017), neither is
it temporally bounded.
While Dillon and others have opened an important historical dimension in the
remediation of urban waste, this economic sector itself remains underhistoricised,
as has the global EGS industry more generally. Seeking to remedy this, I propose
a theory of waste switching that situates the rise of the US EGS industry within a
larger socioeconomic restructuring that occurred throughout the Rust Belt,
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particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, as cities felt the pressures of globalisation
and sought to replace a decimated manufacturing sector (Hathaway 2012; Hobor
2013). Framing EGS in this way historicises the management of toxi-cities in terms
of what Noel Castree (2008) has called “environmental fix”. But more than just a
strategy for deferring crisis into the future, the “fix” of environmental remediation
also seeks to recover the “dead labor” (Marx 1990:342) left over from the trauma
of economic decline and ecological devastation. In developing this point in the
section below, I return to Harvey’s earlier work on the urban process, placing
environmental services within the three circuits of capital he outlines there. This
theory is then fleshed out in case studies of the EGS industry in Baltimore, Pitts-
burgh, and Milwaukee.
What this paper offers is an inverted reading of the rise of the EGS industry,
one that is less about warding off a toxic future and more about warding off
political and economic crisis through the re-collection of a toxic past. Ultimately,
EGS is found to fall short in its ability to revitalise capital accumulation over the
long run. Yet it remains an important reminder of how capitalism’s “inevitable
destruction” can be postponed or, perhaps, prolonged. Will other strategies of
capitalist re-collection emerge in the future or is collapse finally imminent? Rather
than wait around to find out, the paper’s conclusion explores some of the subter-
ranean spaces where more radical forms of re-collection can and do occur—seek-
ing to transform the world, waste and all.
Theory of Waste Switching
Historical Delay
Capitalism has always been a “wasteful system” (Moore 2014) causing alterations
in environmental quality and key global climate variables since the late 18th cen-
tury (Crutzen 2002) and probably earlier. And yet the business of cleaning it up is
a much more recent phenomenon. According to most scholars, the modern EGS
industry did not fully emerge in the US and elsewhere until the 1960s, growing
rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s (Hathaway 2012). How are we to account for this
historical delay?
Of course, many environmental services came into existence far earlier. Waste
disposal practices, as archaeologists have shown, are likely as old as civilisation
itself. In the US, most large cities had municipal programs in place for addressing
water supply, garbage collection, and sewage systems by the end of the 19th cen-
tury (Schoenberger and Walker 2017; Sinclair-Desgagne 2008). But these services
make up only a portion of the modern EGS industry, a sector famously difficult to
measure and define (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007; Fisher et al. 2009). For the OECD
(1999a:9), EGS consists of activities that “produce goods and services to measure,
prevent, limit, minimise or correct environmental damage to water, air and soil,
as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems”. These goods and
services are divided into three groups: resource management, cleaner technolo-
gies and products, and pollution management. The latter includes air pollution
control, wastewater management, solid waste management, remediation and
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clean-up of soil and water, noise and vibration abatement, as well as monitoring,
analysis, and assessment.
Within the amalgam of EGS labour there are different temporalities at play.
Activities like solid waste management might be said to remove and repress the
past, removing unwanted refuse from the visible urban landscape, burying it
beneath the city or in landfills—or else burning it altogether. Services related to
environmental remediation, as I show in the next section, are more therapeutic.
They work through and re-mediate the toxic remains of capitalist production, mak-
ing these productive of value once again, turning environmental “bads” back
into commoditised “goods”. It is the latter group of services that emerged more
recently, beginning in the 1970s before taking off in the late 1980s and 1990s
(Sutherson et al. 2017). Understanding the temporality of environmental
remediation—as always also capital re-mediation—is key to grasping the histori-
cal-geographic roots of this market along with modern EGS more generally as a
profit-generating industry. And yet this is something that most accounts of the
environmental sector fail to do.
In environmental policy fields, the EGS sector is usually framed as the progres-
sive outcome of social movements and specific acts of legislation. Many studies
stress the role played by public concern and grassroots organising in generating
institutional change and providing the impetus for new industries from for-profit
recycling (Lounsbury et al. 2003) to wind energy (Sine and Lee 2009). A recur-
ring motif is how, since the 1960s, the “heroic effort” of the US environmental
movement has led to shifts in public values and the gradual adoption of regula-
tions at national and local levels (Kraft 2000; see also Percival et al. 2015). Such
legislation is often held as the “most important factor” (Vikhlyaev 2004:36) or
“main driver of demand” (Sinclair-Desgagne 2008:3) for environmental goods
and services.
There is of course much truth to this. As federal governments began introduc-
ing comprehensive land restoration policies, these required regulatory compli-
ance. Particularly important in the US was the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1970, which directed federal budgets towards environmental assess-
ment and research. As the remediation industry emerged at the end of the dec-
ade, its main activities included hazardous waste handling, transport, and
disposal. It was not until the 1980s that remediation was consistently imple-
mented for sites that had been contaminated in the past. Such cleanup was made
legally obligatory with the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental
Restoration, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”) in 1980
and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986. Other
important market drivers included the introduction of underground storage tank
(UST) regulations and the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (see Ellis and Hadley 2009;
Sutherson et al. 2017).
Policy-based accounts of EGS formation are tempting. They provide an explana-
tion for the historical delay of the industry: that it emerged at a certain threshold
of public awareness and legal development. It is in this way that environmental
services can be held up as progressive, signifying an advancement over—and
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a willingness to clean up and move on from—“older” and “cruder” forms of capi-
talist production.
Waste Switching
But what if the environmental sector is not an annulment of older cycles of pro-
duction but, on a larger timescale, a continuation of—if not a return to—its value
making potential? Exploring this question requires a temporally robust view of
Harvey’s (2018) anti-value as it relates to the reclamation of environmental toxicity.
Returning to Harvey’s (1989:62) earlier work on the urban process is helpful here,
particularly to his schema of the primary, secondary, and tertiary circuits of
capital, which enabled him to consider production and consumption over
multiple time periods. How does anti-value or waste operate within this
framework—along with its remediation?2
It is important to see how waste takes shape in the primary circuit of capital,
that of commodity production. Rather than an inefficiency or avoidable “external-
ity”, waste is immanent to the production process itself and key to the creation of
surplus value. At this point, waste is supplied by exploited workers who, in being
paid below the value of their labour, serve as the substrate of anti-value from
which surplus value is extracted. Such anti-value is not initially “latent”, in
Moore’s (2015:276) sense, because it appears objectively within immiserated bod-
ies. But it does become concealed: anti-value is displaced at the moment of valori-
sation. On the one hand, waste is displaced onto the commodities themselves in
the form of future decay and actual toxicity. This is evident in the built-in obsoles-
cence of electronic products like Apple iPhones. Once discarded, such devices
release extremely hazardous toxins, often around processing sites in the global
South far from their original points of consumption (Lepawsky and McNabb
2010). Waste is also displaced onto fixed capital, appearing as the depreciation or
“wearing-out” of machinery, buildings, infrastructure, and so forth during the pro-
duction process (Marx 1993:710).
Such displacement might be considered a kind of waste switching. By this I
mean something like the ghostly underbelly of what Harvey (1989, 2006) calls
“switching crises”, wherein capital flows are shifted from one place to another, or
from one circuit to another, opening up new opportunities for productive invest-
ments. Taking place in the background, waste switching is what “cleans up”
these circuits and allows capital to move freely without becoming mired in the
pools of detritus it has left in its path. Starting from the site of production, the liv-
ing waste of unpaid labour is switched into circulating commodities and fixed cap-
ital, where it becomes what Marx (1990:302) calls dead labour or “past labour in
its objectified and lifeless form”. In Harvey’s (2006:236) terms, waste moves from
the primary to the secondary circuit of capital, which is essentially the built envi-
ronment (fixed capital plus a consumption fund made up of commodities that aid
in the consumption process). While this switch frees up surplus value in produc-
tion, it acts as an anti-investment on the secondary circuit, devaluing the built
environment and its surroundings through the release of pent-up toxicity, closing
off landscapes to potential input-channels of capital. Meanwhile, obsolescence
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and anti-value are foisted onto those living in or near areas of toxic decay in the
form of ill-health. Life itself is transformed on a biological level, situating certain
bodies—especially the racialised and gendered poor—as “disposable” parts of the
commodity that is the built environment (cf. Sparke 2017; Wright 2006). Here
anti-value appears as the “phantasmagoria” Marx (1990:165) ascribes to capitalist
society, by which dead things come to wield power over the living and are “en-
dowed with a life of their own”. As this phantasmagoric spell unfolds over time,
entire landscapes are transformed into unreal toxi-cities of dead labour—where
toxins reign.
But the unfolding is important: waste switching is also a temporal displacement
of toxicity into the future (and into future disease). Anti-investments return at a
later date, appearing within different historical configurations of society, technol-
ogy, and economic imperative. Because of the delay, waste becomes a “new”
problem to be solved and can thus create opportunities for productive invest-
ment, especially in the areas of science, public health, and risk management. This
is seen today in the rise of pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries as well as
the emergence of “resilient” urban development—all of which produce commodi-
ties for dealing with rising levels of environmental risk (Wakefield and Braun
2014) but which also impose new risks on other people and places in the process
(Sparke 2017). Environmental goods and services should be viewed along similar
lines, as an industry seeking to cash in on anti-investments, re-collecting the waste
of prior production and repositioning it as the basis for new forms of surplus
extraction. Anti-value is thus “switched back” into capital’s primary circuit, spur-
ring urban growth in ways that weld creative cities to toxi-cities.
The notion of waste switch-back helps to better flesh out the consequences of
Marx’s phantasmagoria for environmental-service work. For Marx, what’s left
behind in the wake of accumulation, in its graves, is not truly dead. However haz-
ardous, dead labour is a commodity. It remains fossilised with the “scientific
power” and “social powers” of its production process, these having been “trans-
posed ... into the dead productive force” (Marx 1993:715). To be valorised, the
dead must be brought back to the surface. As Kirsch and Mitchell (2004:698) put
it, “only living labor can bring the dead labor of the past ... to life”. It is the envi-
ronmental industry, among others, that conjures up (“switches back”) these
ghosts, deferring their death, ensuring that they continue to haunt the present
and infuse it with value. These ghosts turn out to be those of the value-form itself,
the “phantom-like objectivity” (Marx 1990:128) that “disappears” within the
commodity and that is critically revealed as an expression of a social relationship,
that of the capitalist class relation. Placed back within the primary circuit of pro-
duction, the concrete labour of the past, its ecological consequences, is once
again transformed into ghostly abstract labour, congealed within a new commod-
ity (now a service) to be sold at a profit.
This is not a complete reversal, however. The revalorisation of waste demands
quite different patterns of capital allocation than occurred under earlier accumula-
tion regimes. What’s required in particular are new levels of investment in the ter-
tiary circuit of capital, in which Harvey (1989:65–66) includes science and
technology development and other social expenditures related to labour
Time, Waste, and the City 231
ª 2018 The Author. Antipode ª 2018 Antipode Foundation Ltd.
reproduction. This is clearly apparent in the EGS sector, where large amounts of
skilled and “knowledge-based” labour, along with advanced technical equipment,
are generally needed to squeeze value out of waste returns. Especially in cities,
the EGS sector also relies on heavy investments in the secondary circuit. Urban
redevelopment projects and other cleanup activities related to the built environ-
ment, as shown below, generate demand for environmental assessment, remedia-
tion, and monitoring. So while it is true that EGS re-collects and reactivates the
profit potential of earlier cycles of production, it is also bound up with an eco-
nomic restructuring in which capital is more widely dispersed among its three cir-
cuits. Following Harvey’s work, this “spreading out” of capital has particular
consequences for urban struggles, which I return to in the conclusion.
Environmental Fix
We are now ready to tell another story about the rise of EGS. Given the profit-
making potential of waste switching, it should no longer appear solely as a matter
of policy and public awareness that the industry took off in the US during the
1970s and 1980s at the national level. This was amid years of global and national
economic recession, which saw declines in the annual growth rates of US GDP,
particularly from 1974–1975 and 1980–1982 (Amadeo 2017). In complete con-
trast, the EGS sector grew at an annual average between 9% and 11% during this
time, reaching as high as 15% (Berg and Ferrier 1998:7–8). On the urban scale,
the EGS sector became particularly important in the 1980s and 1990s with the
rise of the remediation services, as discussed above. In Rust Belt cities, the grow-
ing environmental industry helped make up for, and was likely spurred on in part
by, losses in large-scale manufacturing jobs during these decades (cf. Holifield
and Zupan 2014). Geographer John Hathaway (2012) has shown how this was
the case in Pittsburgh, whose decimated steel industry has been partially miti-
gated by a growing environmental sector. To the north of the US, in Ontario,
there was a push in the early 1990s to reopen closed industrial plants and repur-
pose them to produce environmentally friendly goods. The goal of the group run-
ning the campaign, the Green Work Alliance, was to “transform the rust belt to a
green belt” (Keil 1994:7). Similar tendencies can be seen in US cities like Balti-
more, St Louis, and Cincinnati, all of which have experienced significant growth
in the EGS sector. Ironically perhaps, much of the environmental work performed
in these locations has been made possible by the very industrial processes it has
sought to replace, as cleanup efforts often deal with old manufacturing pollutants.
The past seems to linger.
And yet cities have tried to move on. The rise of EGS must be viewed as part of
a larger economic restructuring that has occurred over the last three decades.
This transformation has been driven in part by urban policies that, as advocated
by the OECD (1998:25–26), promote the growth of EGS and other “flexible”,
“technology-based” industries to “replace declining ones” and “stimulat[e]
employment”. These new industries belong to what the OECD (1998:15) calls the
“knowledge-based economy” (see also Mitchell and MacFarlane 2018). Within
this economy, a sector like EGS is thought to “create and diffuse new goods and
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services and thereby help instil a culture of innovation” and “encourage invest-
ments in skills” (OECD 1998:25). In practice, such restructuring has produced a
high number of service-sector jobs in the Rust Belt (Hobor 2013) and elsewhere
(OECD 1998:51). While many of these are low-paying and precarious, the EGS
sector generally employs a greater share of high-skilled and creative workers than
other industries, including many engineers, scientists, and business professionals
(OECD 1999b:124). This requires serious investments in science and technology
(Harvey’s tertiary sector). And while services like environmental remediation are
almost always non-basic economic activities that do not, in themselves, bring
new money into a region, they are often key components of larger redevelop-
ment projects that aim to attract new industries and capital flows.
As an important part of urban revitalisation, the EGS industry demonstrates that
environmental catastrophe may simultaneously pose a threat to and boon for con-
tinued accumulation (cf. Cohen and Bakker 2014). On the one hand, the buildup of
toxi-cities has led to the widespread depletion of labour power, food, energy, and
raw materials (Moore 2015:17), in addtion to creating the impetus for regulations
and social movements that have seriously dampened industry’s ability to expand
and provide spatial fix (Futrell 2000). And yet, over the last decade geographers
have shown how environmental externalities can be transformed into a source of
profit. Building off Harvey’s concept of spatial fix, the set of strategies for accom-
plishing this is referred to variously as an “environmental fix” (Castree 2008),
“ecological fix” (Bakker 2009; Castree and Christophers 2015), “socioecological
fix” (Ekers and Prudham 2015; Guthman 2015; McCarthy 2015), or “eco-scalar fix”
(Cohen and Bakker 2014). The EGS sector demonstrates how this fix operates on an
urban scale—but also in reference to past cycles of production.
As fixes, environmental services are conceived, across the literature, as operat-
ing under a neoliberal logic, one that extends market rationalities to environmen-
tal governance while incorporating aspects of the non-human into the circuits of
capital (see, e.g., McCarthy 2015). The focus on neoliberalism, however, peri-
odises environmental services in a way that obscures how many of the pollutants
and hazards addressed by them are leftovers of an earlier (i.e. non-neoliberal)
regime of accumulation. While the EGS industry has provided an urban environ-
mental fix since the 1980s, it has often done so by cleaning up a much older
past. In other words, what is missing in the analysis of environmental fix is phan-
tasmagoria—the notion that past hazards continue to impinge on value in the
present. In addition to producing a demand for “future infrastructure financing”
(Castree and Christophers 2015) polluting practices have, as argued above, left
behind a trail of dead labour, which certain environmental services are able to
recuperate and switch back into the urban market. Unlike neoliberal financial
instruments projecting crisis into the future, the EGS industry re-collects the past,
breathing new life into the dead, drawing out capitalism’s destruction.
Brownfields, Revitalisation, Creative Cities
Toxic legacies plague the landscapes of many US cities today. As industrial waste
accumulated over time and space, contaminated soils began to pose systemic
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risks and shaped urban growth patterns. In particular, they created “new and vex-
ing problems for urban residents and policy makers” while altering “rent-seeking
opportunities for manufacturers, developers” and others (Elliott and Frickel
2015:1744). In Harvey’s terms, waste clogged up the second circuit of capital,
curbing potential investments in the built environment. Much of this clogging
has occurred on what are known as brownfield sites. Brownfields are idle, derelict,
or “underused” parcels of land with real or potential environmental contamina-
tion. They are often located at old industrial or commercial facilities, which have
been cheaper to abandon altogether than to cleanup (Gorman 2003). In the
mid-1990s, brownfields were considered such a significant problem that the US
Conference of Mayors declared them an emergency situation for cities (Bjelland
2004). Pollutants, contaminants, and hazardous substances found at such sites
can pose serious threats to environmental and human health. Those at greatest
risk of exposure tend to be racialised groups and the poor (Taylor 2014). These
health effects are typically filtered through a neoliberal discourse that sees brown-
fields as an economic blight on the area. As underdeveloped land, brownfields
are literally deemed “wasted” opportunities if left alone. As New York City’s gov-
ernment website puts it, “[b]rownfields result in lost opportunities to create small
businesses, new jobs, affordable housing, and healthy open space in areas where
these opportunities are needed most” (NYC.gov 2017). Here poverty, personal
health, and the body itself are reimaged as commodities, awaiting remedy by
market forces.
A major driver in the commodification of urban pollution, the US Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) Brownfields Program was designed to give financial
and technical support to states, communities, and stakeholders to redevelop and
“sustainably reuse” brownfield sites (EPA 2017a). Since its inception in 1995,
most recipients have considered the program successful in “stimulating entrepre-
neurs to remediate and redevelop sites and, sometimes, surrounding neighbor-
hoods” (Greenberg and Issa 2005:83). What is evident in this “success” is how
brownfields work has tied environmental cleanup to local and national economic
imperatives. This is not to ignore the environmental justice effects of the EPA
brownfields program, which has explicitly targeted cities with large minority and
low-income populations (Solitare and Greenberg 2002). However, more recent
empirical evidence suggests major failures, especially since the early 2000s, in the
delivery of this justice (see Dull and Wernstedt 2010). Part of this failure may stem
from the economic rationale built into the program. According to the EPA, “[c]
leaning up and reinvesting in [brownfields] properties increases local tax bases,
facilitates job growth, utilises existing infrastructure, takes development pressures
off of undeveloped, open land, and both improves and protects the environ-
ment” (2017a). It is through these kinds of environmental services that the pollut-
ing practices of an industrial past are recycled and switched back into the
accumulation process. At the same time, these pasts are paved over by the focus
on specific waste streams, which ignores more general histories of accumulation
(Elliott and Frickel 2013) as well as those of environmental injustice.
As former industrial and commercial sites, brownfields are unsurprisingly most
prevalent in Rust Belt cities in the Northeast and Upper Midwest where there
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have been significant losses in industrial employment since the 1970s (Simons
1998). Baltimore, for instance, has over 2500 acres of EPA-designated brown-
field properties (BDC 2010a). In 2002, this landscape included an estimated
1000 abandoned and “underused” industrial sites that were potentially contami-
nated by hazardous wastes left over from former manufacturing activities (Litt
and Burke 2002). Emphasising histories of industrial disinvestment in such areas,
scholars have pointed to the connections, both social and geographic, between
brownfields and poverty rates. For example, in her recent study of brownfield
sites in Western Pennsylvania, legal scholar Krista Yacovone (2011:203) writes
that:
[i]mpoverished and minority populations around brownfield sites experience condi-
tions like those around the steel mills—an economy in decline, decaying infrastructure,
lower property values, detrimental health effects, and increased drug use and crime
rates.
There is an odd temporality in Yacovone’s assessment. Although brownfield sites
are strictly postindustrial, either derelict or abandoned, their social effects are said
to recall a distant industrial past. With its economic focus, brownfields work in the
Rust Belt does not really address this past but conceals it, along with its uneven
social relations, within a green future. Waste is switched out of the built environ-
ment to become the groundwork for new forms of “sustainable” growth. As Holi-
field and Zupan (2014:311) note, “brownfields have become key components of
recent initiatives to regenerate cities in accordance with principles of sustainable
development and environmental justice”. This redevelopment is often intended,
in Rust Belt cities, to create jobs and attract new industries and capital flows (De
Sousa 2014).
Baltimore was at the forefront of the EPA’s brownfields program when it
launched in 1995 (English 2004). This began with two landmark projects in the
late 1990s. The first was the successful 1996 cleanup of 33 acres of the Highland
Marine Terminal next to the Canton neighbourhood. The Baltimore Sun described
the site as “one of those dark, creepy, forgotten urban corners that seen from a
highway or airplane seemed to symbolize the decay of American industry” (Bowie
1996). Cleanup efforts transformed this dilapidated property into cheap ware-
house space for port-related businesses. One of these businesses is the Terminal
Corporation, which provides logistics, warehousing, and transportation services
throughout the Mid-Atlantic Region, opening Baltimore to outside supply chains
and commodity flows. Brownfields redevelopment shows how this economic
growth, and the flexibilisation of space it implied, is directly connected to gentrifi-
cation occurring in Baltimore. Just north of the marine terminal is the former
American Can Company, the site of the city’s second major brownfields project,
which took place in 1997. The reclamation of this manufacturing facility played
an integral role in Canton’s gentrification, which had already been in motion (see
Merrifield 1993).
Baltimore’s investment in brownfields initiatives continued throughout the late
1990s. In 1997, the city began participating in a pilot program under the EPA’s
Brownfield Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund. In the same year, Maryland’s
Time, Waste, and the City 235
ª 2018 The Author. Antipode ª 2018 Antipode Foundation Ltd.
Brownfields Revitalization Incentive Program (BRIP) was established as part of the
state’s Smart Growth policy (Cohen 2002). BRIP incentivised environmental
cleanup, providing grants, loans, and property tax credits for reclamation efforts.
Through these governmental programs, among others, over 40 brownfields pro-
jects have been completed in Baltimore (BDC 2010b). These have added or
retained an estimated 7000 jobs and have attracted more than $500 million in
new investment (BDC 2016).
Today, brownfields remediation plays a major role in the redevelopment of Bal-
timore’s Port Covington. Lying south of the Inner Harbor, Port Covington was
once the site of an important railroad terminal and is now mostly industrial water-
front. In 2016, real-estate firm Sagamore Development announced its plans to
redevelop the 235-acre area. Sagamore, which is owned by billionaire Under
Armour CEO Kevin Plank, must first find a way to clean up the area (Sherman
2016). As stressed in the project’s draft Master Plan, the redevelopment of Port
Covington “begins with thorough environmental assessments and remedial plan-
ning” (Baltimore City 2016). Once cleanup is complete, the redevelopment of
Port Covington will include housing, offices, restaurants, waterfront parks, and a
new global headquarters for Under Armour. While many in Baltimore argue that
the redevelopment of Port Covington will further exacerbate the city’s already
extreme economic and racial disparities, developers and city officials claim it will
bring in thousands of jobs.
With Port Covington, Baltimore enters a market of entrepreneurial cities in com-
petition over a so-called “creative class” (Florida 2005) of high-skilled profession-
als, whose occupations focus on problem solving, knowledge work, and
innovation. The EGS industry not only constitutes a growing segment of this so-
called class but has also helped—through remediation work—to produce the
clean, vibrant, and eco-friendly landscapes with which cities hope to attract addi-
tional creative workers, industries, and investments in all three of circuits of capi-
tal. This is evident in other urban regions like Milwaukee and Pittsburgh, whose
postindustrial revitalisation has been premised on the cleanup and greening of
urban space.3 One example of this is Milwaukee’s redevelopment of the Meno-
monee Valley. Beginning in the 1990s, the project transformed what was once a
1400-acre brownfield district into a “vibrant employment center” in the heart of
the city (De Sousa 2011:46). As Holifield and Zupan (2014:315) describe it, the
project:
emphasized industrial and mixed-use development, designed to create jobs while
enhancing the area’s appearance through the creation of green space. It would
restore the Valley’s manufacturing identity, but this time in a more “sustainable” form
...
Through brownfields work, Milwaukee’s past was reimagined and reconstructed
in a friendlier aesthetic. The project succeeded in this regard, says geographer
Christopher De Sousa (2011:46), and has established the city as “a leader in
sustainable urban economic development”. This sustainable landscape has, in
turn, helped rebrand Milwaukee as an innovative city, replacing images of
declining industry with those of lively culture, environment, and consumption
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(Zimmerman 2008). Creative professionals are welcomed with open arms (Holi-
field and Zupan 2014).
A similar makeover has occurred in Pittsburgh, where over 450 acres of land
have been reclaimed through brownfields initiatives (CEEP 2014). Some consider
this redevelopment as instrumental to Pittsburgh’s “attractive post-industrial suc-
cess”, helping stimulate the local economy and raise property values by millions
of dollars (Robinson 2012). Since the mid-1980s, in fact, many residents have
seen brownfields revitalisation as a means of catering to the creative class (Dieter-
ich-Ward 2016). The growth of environmental services more generally has created
at least 6000 new jobs in the region as of 2012 (Hathaway 2012). These markets
provide a sop for some of the surplus labour cast off from the older manufactur-
ing industries, especially in the areas of waste management, water treatment, and
sustainable infrastructure development, along with other engineering-focused
tasks. The steel industry in Pittsburgh, for instance, spawned an engineering sec-
tor, much of which shifted into environmental work when steel declined. For
some, there is a sense that the greening of Pittsburgh’s economy helps us “forget
Pittsburgh’s plights of the past” (Greenstein 2012). The city’s steel-industry days
seem long behind it.
But such economies do not simply disappear in China or India or somewhere
offshore. Brownfield sites show how past manufacturing cycles, now as phantas-
magoric ruins, continue to play a noxious but valorising role in the present. There
is an interesting dialectic at play here, one that Mark Bjelland (2004:631) begins
to point out in the context of brownfield sites in Minneapolis-St Paul, between
“urban industrial investment and disinvestment”. Decades ago, capital inputs in
cities like Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh sustained destructive practices
that contaminated environments. These environments did not become commodi-
ties in themselves until capital was disinvested from the urban core and derelict
landscapes began to pose an economic problem. Through cleanup activities, pre-
vious investments return with a vengeance. They are, as waste, switched back into
the circuits of production. Over time, long-departed industries reappear on the
market—now in the ghostly green form of environmental services.
Whether in the Rust Belt or elsewhere, waste switch-back can conceal the pri-
vate sector under the facade of public issues. Environmental cleanup is often
framed—especially in the media and popular culture—as an issue of federal, state,
and municipal governance. Indeed, much of the EGS industry’s revenue is derived
from the public sector, from agencies like the EPA and the US Army Corps of
Engineers along with more local entities. Such funds come largely out of taxe
imposed and paid at multiple levels. It would thus seem that EGS work falls under
the purview of electoral politics, with voters and public officials deciding where
and how budgets for cleanup become allocated. And yet the majority of EGS rev-
enue does not in fact come from the government. Most (51%) comes from the
private sector, and this ratio has been growing over the past couple of decades
(Ferrier 2016). This is even more pronounced within urban revitalisation, although
it does not always appear so in states where funding comes primarily from tax-
increment financing—which blurs the boundaries between public and private
backing (see Bjelland and Noyes 2017; Hula and Bromley-Trujillo 2010). Typically
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though, public contracts for environmental cleanup are granted only at govern-
ment-owned sites or at “orphaned” sites where responsible parties have been
impossible to identify. In brownfields work, EGS companies are paid chiefly by
property owners, investors, developers, as well as the older manufacturers who
have been held legally liable. But when these projects are championed by policy-
makers and city officials as the key to smart and sustainable growth, private inter-
ests begin to appear in line with the public good. While EGS firms play a role
in this eco-masquerade, they also show how creative cities are built on toxic
foundations.
Creative Toxi-city
On the surface, the growth and economic vitality of the environmental industry
seems to support Richard Florida’s (2005) “creative class” thesis, in which
postindustrial urban growth hinges on a highly skilled sector of employees in the
areas of science, engineering, education, and computer programming, as well as
media, arts, and design. The majority of environmental-services labour falls within
this demographic. While small-size environmental firms tend to specialise in one
or two areas of expertise (such as hydrology or radiological waste), mid-size firms
take advantage of economies of scope in order to cobble together unique project
teams for addressing the often-complex nature of environmental cleanup. In this
they employ a diverse array of knowledge workers, from civil engineers, hydrolo-
gists, and chemists to biologists, archaeologists, UXO supervisors, and GIS techni-
cians. With a total of 1852 EPA Superfund sites (EPA 2017b), around 25 billion
pounds of toxic chemicals in production-related waste managed each year (EPA
2014), and nearly half of its rivers and streams in poor biological condition (EPA
2016), the US environment seems to have plenty of employment potential for
these labour sectors—plenty of waste to switch back.
It is tempting, then, to see environmental services as conservationists of capital-
ism, helping cities like Baltimore and Pittsburgh back on their feet and, maybe,
getting the global economy back to pre-recession rates of GDP growth. In fact,
due to the dogged rise of the environmental-services sector over the last 50 years,
many within the industry today consider it to be recession immune. During the
last recession, this resiliency appeared to hold true. While the US GDP growth rate
between 2009 and 2010 was close to zero, the environmental industry grew at
2.4% in that period (EBI 2014). In 2015, annual growth in the US environmental
industry rose to 3.5% (while US GDP grew by 2.6%), yielding $363 billion in total
revenues (2.8% of US GDP). The company that compiled these numbers forecasts
an annual average growth of 3–4% in 2017–2019 (EBJ 2016).
But it would be a mistake to consider the environmental-services industry, or
the service sector more generally, as a sufficient replacement for manufacturing or
an environmental fix for local and global economies. There are three reasons for
this. First, the remediation of industrial and military sites remains a relatively small
business compared to older sectors of production. The 7000 jobs sustained by
brownfields cleanups in Baltimore barely make a dent in the 100,000 manufactur-
ing jobs lost between 1950 and 2000 (Boone et al. 2014). Pittsburgh presents an
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even more extreme case. The EGS industry there has generated 6000 jobs, a pal-
try number compared to the 127,500 manufacturing positions razed from 1979
to 1987 (Duryea 2014).
Second, while the EGS sector as a whole is growing, there have been signs of a
slowdown for some time. This has occurred mostly in OECD countries where
overcapacity has reduced market expansion (OECD 2005). For the US EGS indus-
try, growth began to taper off around 1990 and has wavered between 1% and
6% ever since. Hathaway (2012:S111) explains this slowdown as follows:
The production of Superfund sites fell off, asbestos was no longer used, and most
new industrial facilities incorporated increased material efficiency and pollution pre-
vention. In just twenty years of existence, much of the environmental industry showed
signs of maturation such as decelerating growth, heightened competition, growing
sophistication among its clients, greater emphasis on marketing, and consolidation of
market share by larger players.
This decline has been neither constant nor even across the US market. Some
metropolitan areas like Pittsburgh have experienced it less than others. Yet there
has been a secular tendency for revenue growth to decline. While total industry
revenues swelled by 268% between 1980 and 1990, this rate dropped to 40%
from 1990 to 2008 (Hathaway 2012). This was likely due in part to a decrease in
the introduction of new regulations, high levels of compliance with existing regu-
lations, and softened enforcement in the 1990s. It was also bound up with the
decline of venture-capital investments in the industry during that decade, which
fell from $200 million in 1991 to $20 million in 1996 (Berg and Ferrier 1998).
The final reason for EGS’s insufficiency is a temporal one. In the EGS industry,
capital accumulates ex situ. One way or another, the revenues of environmental-
service companies are derived from the refuse of past production, consumption,
and circulation. In this sense, environmental services produce very little that is
new, at least in terms of surplus value. They are conservationists in the true sense
of the word: they conserve the past, rendering it profitable once again. But such
recycling seems to be one of diminishing returns, as the past is cleaned up and
drained of profit potential.
Meanwhile, this past is conserved in more ways than the economic. Many
recent studies demonstrate how environmental services, particularly those aimed
at revitalising the urban core, work to preserve, and often exacerbate social medi-
ations of race, class, and gender. Such work contributes to a growing critical envi-
ronmental justice scholarship (see Benz 2017; Holifield et al. 2009). Much has
been written, for instance, on how brownfield redevelopment in cities benefits an
elite class (Lees 2003) while negatively impacting already vulnerable populations
(Pearsall 2010) and displacing the poor and racialised (Bryson 2012; Essoka
2010). Brownfields programs, along with urban sustainability projects more gen-
erally, often go hand in hand with what has been called “green gentrification”
(Gould and Lewis 2017) or “environmental gentrification” (Banzhaf and
McCormick 2012). This is the process by which green initiatives prepare neigh-
bourhoods for gentrification. As one example, Gould and Lewis (2017) have
shown how environmental services and sustainable development in Brooklyn have
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helped fuel rising property costs and the displacement of low-income and minor-
ity residents. Something similar has happened in Pittsburgh over the past few
years, where greening policies in neighbourhoods like Lawrenceville have skyrock-
eted housing prices, opened the residential market to outside corporate invest-
ment, and forced lower-income individuals out. Sidney Fussell (2017) points out a
deep spatial irony in this:
... in an industrial city like Pittsburgh, which the American Lung Association ranked
among the nation’s worst in air quality, neighborhoods making strides in air or water
quality are pushing low income people out of their own neighborhoods and nearer to
highways crossing the city, where diesel trucks spew black carbon and near industrial
plants where housing is cheapest.
In Pittsburgh and elsewhere, the creative city—its shiny-green aesthetic—is built
in part on the landfill of more destructive forms of urbanisation. These practices
constitute an urban toxicity or toxi-city, one that is embodied in the unfolding of
life and death in enclaves of precarity within the city itself or, as is the case with
the global waste trade, in distant parts of the world. Tracing the geographic flows
and socioeconomic effects of the global environmental industry provides one way
of recognising and situating these toxi-cities in relation to more apparent pro-
cesses of urbanisation. In particular, the geography of environmental services
helps locate within city space what Matthew Sparke (2017:287) has called
“biological sub-citizenship”, where ill-health “embodies changing conditions of
political-economic subordination”. This paper suggests that any study of health
and the city must attend not just to geographies of the present but also to
geographies of the past, to how these are cleaned up, reappropriated, and redis-
tributed today in the construction of new urban fabrics. More work needs to be
done here, to map out the distribution of global toxi-cities and to understand
how urbanisation manufactures and re-collects its material memories.
Conclusion: Insurgent Re-collection
... even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. (Benjamin 1968:255)
Today, the US environmental industry is facing what Walter Benjamin called a “mo-
ment of danger”. With the likes of climate-sceptic Scott Pruitt at the helm of the
EPA, the Trump administration has begun unravelling decades-old environmental
protections. This danger extends beyond the present—into the soils of history. As
Lindsey Dillon has noted, the Trump regime poses a threat to the archive of climate
change itself. Already it has “overhauled important environmental web pages,
removed documents related to climate change, and altered the ways environmen-
tal webpages refer to climate change in a way that obscures or at least significantly
downplays the issue” (quoted in McNulty 2018). What is at stake is not just the era-
sure of prior acts of environmental destruction, but also the future experience and
embodiment of risk within certain places and bodies, at sites where the toxicity of
history may be buried and forgotten, displaced from today’s toxi-cities. As in
Benjamin’s time, the past—and thus the future—is never safe from the enemy.
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And yet, also as in Benjamin’s time, it is a mistake to look on the Trump
regime’s action with amazement, as if “the things we are experiencing are ‘still’
possible in the ... [21st] century” (Benjamin 1968:257). Moments of danger are
also opportunities for struggle. They reopen the past: flashing up forgotten shards
of “waste” that might be seized in the present as points of orientation. This is
especially true in urban spaces where, as Allan Pred (2004:202) underlined in his
last writings, “the past is not dead—but ... rearticulated with new circumstances
and social formations”. Here, waste can be “put into practice”.
The Environmental Data and Governance Initiative (EDGI) is a step in this
direction. EDGI, whose steering committee is chaired by Dillon, is an interna-
tional network of over 85 archivists, academics, lawyers, and others working to
promote and monitor public environmental data. What might be taken from
EDGI is not its overall mission, which seems to be one of shoring up state regu-
lation, warding off “potential threats to federal environmental and energy pol-
icy”. As Wakefield and Braun (2014:10) argue, a radical environmental politics
today “does not reinstantiate government” but creates new spaces of being
beyond those produced by governmental technologies. But there is something
about EDGI’s approach to time that challenges the ontological-focus of Wake-
field and Braun’s (2014:9) political conclusions, which are about how best “to
dwell in the Anthropocene, to experiment with its indeterminate and often terri-
fying futures”. This is a politics shared by Jason Moore (2016:114) whose con-
cept of “liberation” entails the creative capacity “to forge a different ontology
of nature, humanity, and justice”. The question EDGI throws up is this: What if
the horizon of struggle is not the future so much as the past? What if the mate-
rials of revolution are already at our feet, so to speak, in the waste and data left
behind?
Rather than “imagine lines of flight—new territories” (Wakefield and Braun
2014:10) or dream up future “non-capitalist agronomies” (Moore 2015:287),
there is another politics that refuses to wait, that treats the present as already
layered with multiple temporalities and radical possibilities, which are dug up
and switched back at certain moments (see Tomba 2013). Of course, the prac-
tice of digging into time is not radical in itself. Capital accumulation also relies
on temporal strategies, deferring certain futures and revitalising certain pasts.
This paper has pointed to the EGS industry as an increasingly relevant example
of such a strategy, one that places special emphasis on the re-collection of dead
labour. And yet, as the past is brought to the surface—or threatened with era-
sure altogether—another kind of re-collection becomes not only thinkable but
critical.
Different negotiations of time and space come with different consequences for
urban struggle (Harvey 1989). As mentioned above, the rise of the EGS industry is
part and parcel of a tendency to “spread out” capital among Harvey’s three cir-
cuits. This has the overall effect of shifting a degree of pressure off the primary cir-
cuit of capitalist production, concealing (while further entrenching) some of its
contradictions by displacing them onto other spheres of social activity. These
spheres include those related to the secondary and tertiary circuits of capital,
namely the built environment and social reproduction. The result of this
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spreading out is that struggles around wage labour are ever more imbricated
with, and inseparable from, struggles over the right to the city (built environ-
ment) and the right to produce life otherwise (social reproduction). It is no longer
possible, if it ever was, to speak of abolishing class divisions without confronting
the racialised and gendered character of life in the city and its growing “hinter-
land” (Neel 2018). Such constellations of insurgency remain bound together by
waste, by a fidelity to what and to who has been cast aside. Rather than play the
shell game of waste switching, the goal is to break out of the phantasmagoric cir-
cuitry of capital altogether—to re-collect “excess” in ways that refuse to reinsert it
into the same processes from which it had been excreted. This re-collection is
non-creative in the sense that it does not seek out new ontologies or forms of life
quarantined from the toxic grounds of the present—but works to emancipate
what is already here.
One sketch of insurgent re-collection can be found in a short text written by
Walter Benjamin in 1932, left unpublished during his lifetime. In this fragment,
titled “Excavation and Memory”, Benjamin (2005:576) describes archaeological
work as an allegory for remembrance. Like the EGS industry, the archaeologist
digs into the “strata” where “ancient cities lie buried”, returning “again and again
to the same matter; to scatter it as one scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns
over soil”. But what separates Benjamin’s re-collection from that of EGS is that it
does not seek to switch waste back into the circuits of capitalist production.
Instead, the forgotten ruins and images excavated by the archaeologist are “sev-
ered from all earlier associations”. Rather than being remediated, the past is
redeemed from the law of value that separates out people and things as “dead”
or “waste” in the first place.
With its practice of severing—or demediation—the insurgent re-collection of
Benjamin’s archaeologist literally widens the historical-geographic scope of the
urban. What’s produced is an “archaeological report” that is not merely an “in-
ventory of ... findings” but a sharp tool for grasping the landscape beneath its
immediate appearance in the present. It “inform[s] us about the strata from
which its findings originate” along with “the strata which first had to be broken
through”. When taken collectively, such re-collection is inseparable from a militant
urban politics. It provides a map, not of alternatives in the present (see Moore
2015:288) or beyond the present, but of the present itself in a historically charged
form, one that can be seized and transformed. It is around such mineralised
grounding points that urban struggles can and do orient themselves today—link-
ing up with one another in a real Rust Belt that stretches urgently across both
space and time. Here, rather than capitalist society digging its own grave, we take
up the spades ourselves. In the dark loam we excavate a better future, switching
waste out of its circuits once and for all.
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Endnotes
1 In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels argue that the “development of modern
industry ... cuts from under the feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie pro-
duces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are
its own grave-diggers” (2012:50).
2 See Inverardi-Ferri (2018) for another recent attempt to situate waste in relation to Har-
vey’s work and the circuits of capital, but one more concerned with issues of informal
economy.
3 Postindustrial greening has occurred in cities outside the US as well, such as in Ger-
many’s Ruhr Valley (see Wachsmuth and Angelo 2018).
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